To Build a Notion:US State Department Nation Building Expertise and Postwar Settlements in 20th Century East Central Europe by Riga, Liliana & Kennedy, James
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Build a Notion
Citation for published version:
Riga, L & Kennedy, J 2013, 'To Build a Notion: US State Department Nation Building Expertise and Postwar
Settlements in 20th Century East Central Europe' Sociological Research Online, vol 18, no. 2, 21. DOI:
10.5153/sro.3097
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.5153/sro.3097
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Sociological Research Online
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Riga, L., & Kennedy, J. (2013). To Build a Notion: US State Department Nation Building Expertise and
Postwar Settlements in 20th Century East Central Europe. Sociological Research Online, 18(2), [21].
10.5153/sro.3097
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
 1 
To build a notion: US State Department nation building expertise and postwar 
settlements in 20th century East Central Europe1 
 
Abstract: This paper offers a contribution to the sociology of social science knowledge 
practices and expertise through the empirical lens of US nation building policies. Drawing 
on archival materials, the State Department’s Freedom of Information Act documents, and 
interviews with key policymakers we offer a comparative historical sociology of the US 
State Department as a site of nation building knowledge and expertise. In examining the 
evolving character of nation building expertise in three key moments across the twentieth 
century, we find that as nation building expertise and its attendant knowledge practices 
were redefined and institutionally relocated, the essential character of the expertise and data 
collection practices that were valorized shifted from social scientism in the 1910s to 
geopolitical empiricism in the 1940s to liberal legalism in the 1990s. This changing 
character of nation building knowledge practices at the State Department had an effect on 
the substance of US nation building policy.  
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Scholars of social science knowledge practices have examined the production, assessment 
and use of expertise in relation to a variety of social and foreign policy arenas (cf. Skocpol 
and Rueschemeyer 1996; O’Connor 2001; Amadae 2003; Gilman 2004; Parmar 2004; Rich 
2004; Light 2005; Kuklick 2006; Fourcade 2009; Medvetz 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Camic, 
Gross and Lamont 2011). This paper offers a contribution to this growing body of work by 
examining the knowledge claims and expertise involved in an important policy area: US 
thought and deliberation in advance of postwar nation-building settlements. From postwar 
Europe, to Bosnia, to Iraq and Afghanistan, US influence on postwar settlements has been 
substantial. Yet the kinds of knowledge practices constitutive of US social thought leading 
to its postwar nation-building policies remain sociologically underexplored. Examined 
through the analytical lens of knowledge practices, the evolution of US social thought on 
nation building offers insights into how the institutional locations and particular social 
valorizations of expertise and evidence can affect both knowledge production and policy. 
More specifically, the US Department of State has episodically been a key site for 
crafting knowledge and expertise around the institutionalization of multiethnic 
democracies. Our analysis centres on three such episodes of data collection and 
deliberation as State Department officials prepared for postwar settlements in East Central 
Europe (ECE): in 1917-19 in advance of the Paris Peace Conference, preparations for the 
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territorial and demographic contours of post-WWII ECE in 1939-45, and in the US State 
Department’s 1992-95 conflict analyses leading to the Bosnian Dayton Accords.  
We make two claims. First, our substantive findings suggest that between 1919 and 
1995, the character of legitimate expertise around democratic nation building was redefined 
and institutionally relocated. We characterize the nation building expertise of the 
Progressive Era as social scientific, institutionally residing outside the State Department 
among a group of 150 select academics; in the late New Deal years, preparations for the 
postwar peace were marked by a distinctive geopolitical empiricism, initially straddling the 
newly reorganized State Department and the reconstituted successor to the Inquiry, the 
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), before folding into the Department’s specially tasked 
committees; and although by 1995 ECE/Balkan experts were firmly embedded within the 
State Department’s enormously expanded bureaucracy, relevant expertise in pre-Dayton 
analysis was liberal legalist, institutionally located among human and civil rights lawyers in 
the State Department’s Legal Advisor’s Office.2  
Our analytical claim is that as the social location of nation building expertise 
changed—and as the character of the expertise shifted from social scientism to geopolitical 
empiricism to liberal legalism—the analytical quality of nation building knowledge became 
increasingly more abstracted from the empirical, real world context. This evolution in what 
qualified as legitimate evidence and expertise meant that by the mid-1990s, nation building 
came to be conceptualized as a generic policy problem, whose solution lay in universally and 
widely applicable formulae, rather than as a contextually contingent, political or localized 
problem, requiring specialist, substantive knowledge.  
We adopt a comparative historical sociological research design (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003): the US State Department and East Central Europe are examined 
across three time periods, allowing us to track the cumulative effects of US policy expertise 
on a single issue area. Data is drawn from the following sources: (1) autobiographies and 
biographies; (2) in-depth interviews with key policymakers involved in the Dayton Accords; 
and (3) archival materials from collections across seven government and university 
archives. The data is of variable quality across the three cases: extensive on the first two, 
and more limited on the third because much still remains classified. So our claims for the 
latter are more tentative and preliminary.  
We also draw upon two intersecting areas of scholarship. First, we extend studies in 
the ‘turn to practice’ through an examination of how political cultures, institutions and 
bureaucratic logics create the categories used in the production of social science knowledge 
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and shape the day to day practices involved in generating recognized expertise or valid 
social science evidence (see, inter alia, Skocpol and Rueschemeyer 1996; O’Connor 2001; 
Abbott 2005; Fourcade 2009; Camic et al. 2011; Medvetz 2012). This body of work views 
conceptualizations of social orders, for instance, as associated with institutionally 
embedded practices, just as knowledge claims and styles of reasoning can be made ‘on the 
basis of tacit knowledge [acquired] as members of that particular society and state’ 
(Fourcade 2009: 15). Not all of this is entirely new, of course. Mannheim (1936) and 
Merton (1945), among others, drew attention to the roles of intellectuals within state 
bureaucracies and to how social problems were framed by institutional knowledge 
practices.   
But this is a particularly important insight as bureaucratically organized government 
consolidated between 1877 and 1920 in the US’s own state building years: shifts from local 
to federal administrative capacities and bureaucratic rationalization (Skorownek 1982) were 
accompanied by a greater awareness of geopolitical constraints. As Max Weber (1978: 971) 
observed, ‘the United States still bears the character of a polity which, at least in the 
technical sense, is not fully bureaucratized’, though this was likely to change, he suggested, 
‘the greater the zones of friction with the outside and the more urgent the needs for 
administrative unity at home become’. In fact, as the century progressed, US federal 
bureaucrats increasingly mobilized intellectual elites’ social knowledge for policy purposes, 
drawing into more entwined relationships with both academia and think tanks (Skocpol 
and Rueschemeyer 1996: 6-8, 11). Meanwhile, as the State Department expanded its tasks 
and functions, think tank structures were transplanted into the State Department’s 
organizational bureaucracy (Smith 2003: 329), with important implications for where 
expertise was deemed to reside.  
The second area of scholarship on which we draw, therefore, reflects the 
intersectionality of think tanks, policymakers and academics as a critical ideational nexus 
for mobilizing and crafting foreign policy knowledge (cf. Goldstein and Keohane 1993; 
Amadae 2003; Gilman 2004; Parmar 2004; Light 2005; Atanasoski 2006; Kuklick 2006; 
Abela 2009; Mallard and Lakoff 2011; Medvetz 2012). Kuklick (2006), for instance, 
identified three types of experts in the postwar years (scientifically-oriented intellectuals, 
foreign policy social scientists, and university-based academics) as he gauged the influence 
of their interpretive frameworks; whereas other scholars have explored how the social 
knowledge produced in think tanks (e.g. modernization theory, rational choice theory, war 
planning scenarios) shaped foreign policy discourse (Abela 2009), New Deal liberalism 
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(Gilman 2004), the 1960s Great Society programs (Amadae 2003), and urban planning 
practices (Light 2005). In the post-war years especially, think tanks functioned as a distinct 
underground of intellectual production: in content, they comprised a ‘conservative counter-
intelligentsia’ that rejected New Deal Keynesianism, but in form they became the sources 
of the ubiquitous ‘policy paper’ and ‘issue brief’ (Kulick 2006; Medvetz 2009), and their 
practices were often directly grafted onto the organization of the State Department’s own 
institutional knowledge practices.  
Over time, knowledge claims within these ‘hybrid interstitial fields’ (Medvetz 2011, 
2012) became increasingly politicized for advocacy or partisan purposes (Smith 1991; 
Parmaar 2004; Rich 2004); while the early professionalization of the social sciences and the 
creation of the disciplines into systematic subjects with distinct knowledge boundaries 
made think tank expertise available for policy analysis, eventually facilitating its 
incorporation into government bureaucracies (cf. Ross 1991; Camic and Xie 1994; Skocpol 
and Rueschemeyer 1996: 10; Abbott 1999; Shulten 2001; Adcock 2003). And the 
historically small size of available institutions and bureaucracies capable of absorbing social 
science knowledge elites, combined with the more general technocratic character of the US 
social sciences, nudged academics to become, in Medvetz’ typology, a mix of academic 
specialist, policy expert, entrepreneur and media specialist (Medvetz 2008: 5-10, 2009, 
2010; see also Ross 1991; Converse 2009). So while the social science disciplines ‘turned to 
science’, defining useable knowledge as generalizable, abstract frameworks (for example, 
Adcock 2003: 506-8), think tank expertise became a full-service ‘organizational device for 
gathering and assembling forms of authority conferred by the more established institutions 
of academia, politics, business, and the media’ (Medvetz 2008: 9-10). As these entwined 
relationships evolved, then, expertise was redefined and institutionally relocated. In the 
process, what was deemed ‘usable knowledge’ changed: nation-building knowledge shed 
the substantive quality of its original instantiation as a knowledge problem and it re-emerged as 
a generic and decontextualized policy problem.  
In the following sections, we trace the evolution of nation building knowledge 
practices through the State Department in three key moments, before reflecting on how 
shifts in both expertise and in the interpretive frameworks used by social 
scientists/academics, policymakers and think tanks affected nation building foreign policy. 
 
Charisma outside the framework: The Inquiry and the new academic expertise 
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The first moment reflected the influence of the newly constructed ‘academic experts’ of the 
emerging social science disciplines. In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked his advisor, 
Colonel Edward House, to gather academics to collect data on preparing the post-war 
peace, and to translate his commitment to ‘national self-determination’ into new borders 
and states across ECE (Gelfand 1963).3 This created ‘The Inquiry’, the first US think tank. 
‘Stress [was] laid on the obtaining of information, secretly prepared by non-official experts’ on 
the subjects likely to confront negotiators.4 For fourteen months, the Inquiry worked in 
secret with funds from the President, in relative isolation and independent of the electoral 
process. Their voluminous work product—ethnographies, maps, population statistics, 
personality sketches, and economic and national histories—became the empirical basis for 
most of Versailles’ territorial decisions; these new academic experts became official 
‘technical advisors’, thereby marginalizing the diplomatic expertise of the State Department 
and the Military Intelligence Division (Lansing 1921: 4-5; Nicholson 1933: 128-9; Seymour 
1965: xxx-xxxi). Relevant and usable policy knowledge, in other words, resided entirely 
outside the foreign policy expertise of the State Department, with academic influence 
directly channelled to the White House and its advisors (see Figure 1). 
As a former professor of Political Science and President of Princeton University, 
Wilson had a strong affinity with academic expertise. But he had also distrusted the ability 
of State Department officials to advise on postwar nation building, so the Inquiry’s 
influence partially rested on its dissociation from the State Department (Lansing 1921: 8). 
Wilson staffed the Inquiry with 150 academics, scholars, professional economists and 
intellectuals because of their ability to collect and analyze ‘factual evidence’. So this was a 
very insular, northeast academic or intellectual coast elite.5 
But US geopolitical isolation had left an important legacy: very few Inquiry 
members were knowledgeable about ECE. Inquiry members were chosen through social 
and professional networks rather than on the basis of relevant academic expertise. Because 
a general capacity for scholarship was valorized (Gelfand 1963; Grose 2006), in substantive 
expertise they embodied quite disparate intellectual resources: a few were historians or 
economists of Poland or Austria-Hungary, others were archaeologists and scholars of 
Greek antiquity. As one key member of the Inquiry noted, ‘intellectual qualities and 
working habits’ were determinative (Seymour 1965: xxvii), on the belief that these qualities 
would enable them—through the collection of ‘factual data’—to become substantive experts. 
 6 
So partly because of their social composition, and partly because of their 
institutional location, their knowledge practices were embedded in a particular interpretive 
framework, one in which the problem was defined in substantive-empirical, political terms. 
 
Figure 1:  State Department Organization, 1911 
 
 
Source: Office of the Historian, US Department of State, (PA/HO) 
 
Despite this diversity, however, as a particular generational cohort the Inquiry 
embodied the social scientific Progressive ethos of the era, something they brought to the 
newly constructed academic expert. They had come of political age between the 1890s and 
1910s, defined by American Progressivism’s moral and ideological content, a Protestant-
inspired pragmatic morality that married domestic reform to liberal internationalism 
(Hofstadter 1955: 149, 152-3; Link 1959; Thelen 1969: 323-41; Fox 1993: 641, 643, 652; 
McGerr 2003). With university salaries rising, and academic influence inside and outside 
the government expanding through the diffusion of journals and associations, their 
‘scientific peace’ was intended as an important public service. On the conviction that social 
ills could be solved rationally, scientifically and pragmatically—that is, through a 
dispassionate approach to ‘factual data’—the Inquiry’s analyses, and the evaluative criteria 
that they applied to the data, embodied many of the social assumptions of Progressivism’s 
expanding middle classes and professions (on the latter, Clubb and Allen 1977). In this 
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way, the Inquiry’s academic experts—institutionally positioned to influence from outside 
the foreign policy establishment—began to build a body of social thought on how to 
promote multiethnic democracy.  
 
Data and deliberation: the ‘social science’ of nation building knowledge 
 
Their body of nation building social thought and expertise was governed by knowledge 
practices distinctive to the emergent social science disciplines. Most generally, in order to 
formulate nation-building policy, the Inquiry rejected what they termed the ‘balance sheet 
method’. Instead, they viewed their task as simply the factual analysis of the ‘effectuation of 
policy’, or an exhaustive evaluation of how to best apply given policy principles.6 They did 
not consult the State Department’s policy offices for their expertise on these policy 
principles, and the Inquiry never viewed its own work product as an empirical basis upon 
which to either challenge or verify general policy principles. They simply sought to test 
policy applications and implications. 
For this, the Inquiry only sought that ‘usable knowledge’ that resulted from ‘social 
scientific’ methods of analysis. And so they produced more than 3,200 original maps and 
reports, drawn from three kinds of data sources. The first source was a mix of cartographic 
and statistical collections, mostly maps based on Prussian, Tsarist and Austro-Hungarian 
ethnographic/census data, and information from the State Department and Military 
Intelligence.7 A careful analysis of these materials would privilege the systematic, fact-
finding ‘objectivity’ that was emerging in the social science disciplines (on the general point, 
Camic and Xie 1994). Yet this kind of data was treated sceptically and evaluated critically 
because of the ‘unreliably biased’ political leaning of much of its ECE sourcing.8 So Inquiry 
academics debated at length the biases embedded in their data collection and in its 
interpretation, continually challenging how much of it could be considered reliable, ‘usable 
knowledge’. 
The second type of data was drawn from non-academic sources: views of American 
missionaries in the Balkans regarding the social requirements of religious toleration were 
solicited;9 entreaties of East European leaders were considered;10 specially commissioned, 
real-time investigative missions by the State Department offering assessments of social 
conditions in Poland were consulted;11 they assessed reports and petitions from East 
European and Balkan immigrants groups in the US, on the need to protect Jews, for 
instance (cf. Fink 2004);12 the ‘actual life and experience’ of Inquiry’s own members, whose 
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observations might be ‘impartial’ were deemed usable knowledge;13 and material from other 
agencies across the US government were critically evaluated.  
And third, purer academic data was solicited, either through articles in the American 
Political Science Review or the Journal of Race Development (later to become Foreign Affairs) (Buck 
1916),14 or by approaching specific academics: Chicago sociologists W.I. Thomas and 
Florian Znaniecki were asked to ‘help with the sociological aspect of the [Polish] 
problem—the question of race, nationality, education, population, cultural aspirations, 
religious differences’ and Poland’s ‘cultural productivity’.15 The Inquiry also commissioned 
reports from Central European scholars.16 All of these contributions were critically 
evaluated as academic work product:17 in the interest of intellectual deliberation, they 
internally circulated these outside academic reports—and their own reports and analyses—
for vetting and peer review before final presentation.18 
Significantly, then, the Inquiry’s new kind of academic experts sought to marshal 
these three kinds of data in order to make an original, academic contribution to knowledge. 
As Seymour (1951: 5) later wrote, ‘the quality and range of the geographical material at [the 
Inquiry’s] disposal and the stress laid upon it in discussion exceeded anything in preceding 
diplomatic gatherings’. The maps drawn up by the Inquiry were intended to be of such 
detailed and meticulous accuracy as to constitute ‘an improvement on any existing 
published [academic] work’.19 Still, if the exceptional quality and quantity of their data—and 
their growing expertise—could contribute to academic scholarship, they nonetheless did 
not try to challenge the general policy principles that guided it.  
But the Inquiry did bring two additional evaluative criteria to their nation building 
data collection, and both derived from their theorizations of America’s own diverse 
democracy. The first was a distinctive conceptualization of ethnicity and assimilation, 
explicitly predicated on evaluations of America’s immigrant groups. Drawn from many of 
the social science claims that framed the US’s own immigrant and racial climate, that is, 
from statistical, sociological and ‘ethnological’ measurements, assessments, and attempts at 
intellectually grasping its many ‘races and peoples’ (King 2000; Perlmann 2001; Ngai 2004; 
Zolberg 2006: ch. 7), the Inquiry’s experts adapted the very same techniques and social 
assumptions—including the use of racial hierarchies and eugenicist characterizations (King 
2000: 68, Table 3.2)—that were used domestically in order to better grasp conditions of 
ECE’s nationalities. This was facilitated by the fact that many were the same groups, e.g. 
Poles, Czechs, Russians and Jews. In fact, the US Dictionary of Races and Peoples (1911), 
produced by the Congressional Dillingham Commission’s investigation America’s 
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immigrants, replicated in the Inquiry’s work on ‘ethnological’ characteristics in both form 
and substance (cf. Zeidel 2004),20 this critically included its conflation of class and 
‘ethnicity’, or the causal assignment of economic mobility to cultural values (King 2000: 60-
3). 
These racial/ethnic classifications and assessments of assimilation involved what 
was understood as a social scientific analysis of ‘the objectivity of subjective phenomenon’. 
One of Thomas’ submissions to the Inquiry, for instance, argued that, unlike in the US, 
ECE did not have objective ‘races’—only language groups—but that East Central 
Europeans would nevertheless feel themselves to be races.21 This interesting assumption was 
woven through much of the Inquiry’s evaluative work as they sought to grasp the social 
impacts of ECE’s racial distributions, classifications and hierarchies.22 In this regard, then, 
they generally adopted the Chicago sociologists’ pluralist assessments of capacities for 
assimilation and potential for self-government. Indeed, through the Inquiry’s work, the US 
delegation sought to create ‘an ethnographic Poland’ around precisely these Chicagoan 
considerations (Haskins and Lord 1920: Part I).  
The second evaluative criteria used in their construction of nation building 
knowledge involved the belief that democratic stability and social cohesion required some 
level of value homogeneity. Of course this countered their social scientific recognition that 
even scientifically grounded ‘ethnological’ evaluations and meticulous social scientific 
ethnographic studies could not by themselves form the basis of a non-politicized, 
‘objective’ resolution of this problem. The Inquiry conceded, therefore, that their social 
science practices were less useful in interpreting political value claims. Wilson had asked his 
territorial advisors to conduct a rigorous social scientific application or effectuation of his 
principles of national self-determination, and then to ‘tell me what’s right…give me a 
guaranteed position’. But as Seymour (1951: 17, 19) noted, ‘[Wilson] couldn’t tell [us] how 
to interpret justice in the case of conflicting rights’, especially once the ‘reasonable 
adjustments of political interests’ of the Old Europe were discarded as the basis of the 
territorial settlements in favour of a new social scientific consensus. How could the 
Inquiry’s academic experts draw up a statistically sound ‘non-political justice’ (Seymour 
1951: 20)? In practice, then, the consequences of their assumptions about homogeneity and 
social cohesion simply meant that nationalist demands were supported if they anyway 
followed or supported ethnographic realities.23  
So if the Inquiry’s work product was not considered a sufficient basis upon which 
to make historical and political value judgements, for all its meticulousness and 
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rigorousness in the academic knowledge practices, their research was never used as a basis 
from which to critique or support the general policy principles that they were asked to 
consider. But the Inquiry’s work product and expertise did constitute the first substantial 
body of thought and policy analysis on the social science knowledge of nation building. 
And if their findings did not offer scope to question the organizing principles of the wider 
policy itself (because this latter knowledge institutionally resided in the State Department’s 
policy offices) this became a lesson learned: by 1945, expertise and usable nation building 
knowledge would require not only proficiency in specific subjects or substantive areas, e.g. 
academic or social scientific analysis, but also a broader knowledge of the wider geopolitical 
issues at stake. As key Inquiry members would later understand it, the missing component 
to their evolving expertise was a geopolitically sensitive empiricism. Pure academic analysis 
would begin to slip out of its direct and influential role on the Executive Branch as it 
started to institutionally embed in the State Department’s knowledge practices. 
 
Straddling arenas: from Council on Foreign Relations to State Department experts  
 
By the early 1940s, then, an explicitly policy-aware geopolitical empiricism defined the 
collection of data in preparation for series of defining conferences: Tehran [1943], Yalta, 
Potsdam [both 1945] and Paris [1946/7]. And unlike the earlier Inquiry’s very influential 
recommendations, the influence of think tank and State Department recommendations on 
the final outcomes was mixed, even negligible, in part because geopolitical constraints 
underlined by the growing power of the Soviet Union had narrowed the options—
something many State Department analysts seemed to have anyway anticipated (O’Sullivan 
2008: 116, and Ch.7).24 Yet the way in which the problem of postwar nation building was 
constructed and analysed nevertheless contributed a new and distinctive set of 
organizational and intellectual knowledge practices to the State Department’s evolving 
social thought on democracy promotion. 
One influential institutional location for the production of nation building 
knowledge was the new, business-oriented incarnation of the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR), which had merged with a number of scholars from the Inquiry in 1921. The latter 
brought expertise, experience and high-level diplomatic contacts from 1919, and the 
former provided the funding for what would become the most influential foreign policy 
think tank (Grose 2006: 5-9). Prior to the US’s entry to WWII, the CFR undertook postwar 
planning from its position outside government, even as it sought close links with 
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government and philanthropy. The CFR initiated the ‘War and Peace Studies’ project 
(WAPS) in 1939, and rather than work independently of government bureaucracies as the 
Inquiry had done, WAPS experts—most of whom were academics—worked in 
conjunction with officials at State. Institutional ties now ran deep. Though many at CFR 
had academic credentials or previous experience at Versailles, they now had one foot in 
government: CFR officials were made available to the State Department, and several had 
formal positions at State (e.g. the economist Jacob Viner was affiliated with the CFR’s 
WAPS and with State). The CFR also established a ‘Territorial Committee’ within its 
organization; Bowman (an Inquiry alumnus) headed it as it prepared materials for the State 
Department.25 Through both WAPS and the Territorial Committee, then, the CFR 
undertook studies on American interests on the postwar peace and forwarded them to the 
State Department.26 As the knowledge nexus among academics, government and think tank 
institutionally embedded, the CFR also deepened its relationship with key philanthropic 
foundations: to keep its relationship with the State Department confidential, WAPS was 
entirely supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, and in 1943, Shotwell, another Inquiry 
alumnus and member of WAPS, was Director of the Division of Economics and History at 
the Carnegie Endowment.  
The second influential location for the development of expertise and new 
knowledge practices was inside State Department itself. Most important was a secret, loose 
committee established by Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles in 1939: the Advisory 
Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations (O’Sullivan 2008: 33-4). Between 1939-43, 
this committee liaised with CFR and prepared US postwar policy. This subsequently also 
enveloped a cluster of related knowledge groupings and subcommittees.27 So in the year of 
the US’s entry into WWII (see Figure 2), Welles’ initiative remained informal, and while it 
drew staff from the State Department, it was not formally part of its organizational 
structure. 
 In sum, then, the institutional location for postwar nation-building knowledge 
around the State Department remained organizationally somewhat ad hoc, ‘periodic 
permutations’ rather than major restructurings (Smith 2003: 328). Instead of constructing 
permanent departments, additional ‘advisory committees’ and ‘special research divisions’ 
were created to circumvent the cumbersome foreign policy bureaucracy. In 1941, for 
example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull created a new Division of Special Research (see 
Figure 2), and he appointed Leo Pasvolsky as its Special Assistant, directly answerable to 
Hull, and Isaiah Bowman, now seconded from the CFR’s Territorial Committee.28  
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Figure 2:  State Department Organization, 1941 
 
Source: Office of the Historian, US Department of State, (PA/HO) 
 
Additionally, the organizational structure of the CFR’s substantive expertise was 
‘transplanted into government’ (Smith 2003: 329). In 1942 the State Department created an 
Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy to oversee postwar planning; its members 
were a mixture of State Department officials and CFR academic-cum-policy elites, with the 
latter dominating the Committee’s expertise and practices.29 And in 1944, another secret 
Advisory Council on Postwar Foreign Policy—comprised of Senators and academic 
experts primarily outside of government—was created to similarly advise State.30 This may 
have been a political initiative designed to keep non-official American opinion on side, but 
the Secretary of State and CFR members chaired it. 
These changing institutional arrangements had a direct effect on knowledge 
practices through the more relativized and institutionally embedded role of academic input 
in policy knowledge production and expertise. They also began to detach substantive, area 
academic knowledge from what would be usable nation building knowledge. Moreover, in 
this mid-century period philanthropic funding, think tanks and the State Department 
became more closely entwined through personnel and through the creation of parallel 
substantive organizational expertise. Many foreign policy elites in Roosevelt’s 
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administration were New Deal liberals of some stripe, including those that had been either 
politically active in Wilson’s administration (e.g. Bowman, Shotwell and Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs) or otherwise products of the Progressive era more 
generally (Welles). This had implications in terms of the kind of social knowledge that was 
valorized as useful and valid. Geopolitical empiricism pragmatism characterized their 
interpretive framework and dominated their data collection. 
In particular, the role of the State Department’s Division of Special Research 
testified to the re-location of expert knowledge and to the appropriation of policy relevant 
knowledge by the State Department—in sharp contrast to the practices of the earlier 
Inquiry. It also meant that the analytical quality of nation building social thought would be 
partly guided by a newly found expertise on the geopolitical implications of their empirical 
research. On Pasvolsky’s instigation, for instance, his assistant Harley Notter looked back 
at the Inquiry’s work and concluded that organizational distance from government had 
made the Inquiry’s deliberations too case specific, in part because they had neglected the 
State Department’s geopolitical expertise.31 In other words, the substantive contextual 
specificity that had characterized nation building knowledge in 1919 now had to be 
tempered by more a geopolitically informed analysis of democratic nation building.  
 
Data and Deliberation: Geopolitical Empiricism  
 
So both the CFR’s committee structure and its distinctive knowledge practices—many of 
which replicated those of the Inquiry—began to impose a particular organizational 
structure on the State Department’s postwar planning. Substantively, this implied an 
important, if subtle, shift in terms of the character or quality of nation-building expertise. 
The social scientism of Progressivist thought and its particular knowledge practices were 
set within a greater sensitivity to a new geopolitical thinking: it distinguished territorial 
geopolitics from economic geopolitics and it was more thematic and conceptual, less 
specific or substantialist, in orientation. Empiricism was still valorized, but now it was 
anchored by a robust geopolitical conceptual framework reflective of emerging US 
hegemony—a direct response to both the collapse of the interwar international order and 
to the US’s greater role in the bipolar world. 
So by the early 1940s, US nation building social thought as embodied in the 
Department of State was less concerned with theorizing or understanding diversity itself, 
and more with embedding individualism within liberal institutions. Roosevelt had defined 
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freedom in his 1941 State of the Union Speech as ‘the supremacy of human rights 
everywhere’ (Mazower 2004: 387). The generally accepted view was that human rights 
individualism was not simply an extension of America’s own political system, but also the 
only viable alternative to the failed minority rights regime of 1919—designed largely by the 
earlier Inquiry. This was one of the social knowledge lessons learned in light of the ethnic 
nationalist excesses that had escaped solution in the interwar years. By 1941, minority or 
group rights were collapsed into individual rights, and the former were excluded from both 
the Atlantic Charter and from the UN Declaration. This was done on the growing belief 
that individual rights would be robust enough to contain nationalism’s excesses.  
But now there was also a wider geopolitical calculation involved on the part of 
CFR’s academics and policymakers (Parmaar 1999). In 1939, CFR elites had urged State 
Department officials to immediately begin preparing for the US’s entry to the war, so they 
placed all of the CFR’s think tank resources at the Department’s disposal. The war, they 
believed, provided the US with a ‘grand opportunity’ to emerge as the leading world power 
(Smith 2003: 325). The geographer Bowman had a prominent position from which to make 
this case as the chair of committees in WAPS and in the Division of Special Research at 
State. The German school of geopolitics was his formative training: it combined political 
and economic geography and emphasised the geographical dimensions of international 
relations (Schulten 2001: 89). So if the failed minority rights regimes of the interwar years 
had reinforced Bowman’s views, in keeping with the earlier knowledge practices of the 
Inquiry, he also prompted State Department experts to draw on existing academic or 
scholarly work.32  
Bowman, Pasvolsky and Notter’s work at the Division of Special Research 
suggested that broad geopolitical knowledge needed to be brought to bear on postwar 
democracy planning, particularly with respect to protecting growing US interests.33 Though 
most of their ECE country reports were quite similar to those compiled by the Inquiry,34 
Bowman latter acknowledged that a recognition of the fuller international implications of 
territorial and other recommendations was now the organizing imperative of postwar 
planning and its underpinning values and knowledge practices (Bowman 1942, 1946).35  
Therefore, relevant knowledge claims across this network of philanthropic, think 
tank and State Department elites largely revolved around postwar states’ economic 
viability. In keeping with the New Dealers’ liberal belief that economic prosperity—not 
cultural protection—was the key to political stability, for the State Department’s ECE 
planners this meant that small states had to recognize geopolitical ‘actualities’ rather than 
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the ‘legal fiction’ of full sovereignty within, for example, any putative ‘Danubian 
confederation’ or ‘confederation of the Lowlands’; but it also meant that liberalism could 
ensure that cultural autonomy would be protected.36 Welles envisioned an East European 
Federation stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic with Vienna at its core; and 
Czechoslovakia, in particular, was identified as a potential bastion for democracy and free 
trade within this putative federation (O’Sullivan 2008: 115-6, 124). So while the Territorial 
Committee at WAPS recognized that ‘Eastern Europe is the area of the world about which 
America’s ignorance is the most profound’,37 various regional associations were 
nevertheless confidently considered.38 But they were more narrowly and pragmatically 
conceptualized in terms of economic prosperity and social mobility, effectively as customs 
unions, not as cultural or ethnic entities.39  
Moreover, as knowledge practice, this new geopolitical empiricism also 
characterized the organizations that sought to influence State Department activities. For 
instance, the Carnegie Endowment funded an independent intellectual/academic grouping, 
led by former Inquiry member and now Columbia Professor of International Relations, 
Shotwell: his influential Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP)40 was 
composed of sixty prominent foreign policy experts—many still academics—and it offered 
an enormous reservoir of analysis (used by Shotwell as he assisted State Department 
planners on the structure of the United Nations). CSOP forcefully pushed the State 
Department the idea that international social agencies armed with an emergent human 
rights discourse needed to meet socioeconomic inequities for a stable peace to take hold 
(DeBenedetti 1974; Mitoma 2008). In this endeavour, CSOP’s reports and bulletins on an 
outline of a new world order self-consciously applied ‘the scientific method to international 
affairs’.41  
 Taken in their totality, then, from Shotwell’s science of international politics to 
Bowman’s geopolitics, think tank and State Department drives to organize experts and 
collect data as ways of planning for peace retained a commitment to empirical research. But 
their knowledge practices and the resulting social thought on nation building were 
developed in service of a more abstracted formulation of the policy or research problem. 
Nation building knowledge and its requisite expertise moved decidedly away from their 
earlier substantive contextual anchoring in the realities of ECE’s nationalities, and toward a 
more formulaic and generic construction of nation building as abstracted policy problem. 
 
Policy insurgency: human rights lawyers and Balkans specialists 
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By the 1990s, then, the institutional nexus of nation building knowledge and expertise 
around the US State Department had substantially changed its character. As the Clinton 
administration struggled to rearticulate its role as the only post-Cold War superpower 
(Shattuck 2003; Chollet and Goldgeier 2008), the postwar diffusion of universalist human 
rights principles now formed the context for US social thought on nation-building (cf. 
Nystuen 2005; O’Brien 2010). As the ‘peace agreement decade’, one-half of all civil wars in 
the 1990s ended with peace treaties organized around human rights frameworks (Bell 
2006),42 and US lawyers participated influentially in this ‘post-Cold War rule of law 
movement’, fusing American rights culture and legal constitutionalism with international 
human rights law (Henkin 1979; Klug 2000; Mazower 2004; Ignatieff 2005). 
So intervention in the Bosnian conflict more generically reflected a trend toward 
political and constitutional reconstruction within a ‘liberal legalist’ framework (see Shklar’s 
original formulation, but also Bass 2002 and Hagan 2003 on the 1990s US). In particular, 
federalism (or the spatial division of power), the separation of branches (including judicial 
review and judicial supremacy), and the idea of constitutional rights (Klug 2000) were key 
liberal legalist influences on dozens of new constitutions (Klug 2000: 603; Koh 2003; 
Ignatieff 2005). They were also at the core of the Dayton settlement. But because the 
majority of global conflicts were ethnically inflected, these settlements also had to come to 
terms with cultural or minority claims. Consequently, US social knowledge of multiethnic 
democracy embedded legalist, individualist human rights within a political architecture that 
avoided collective rights—something that by the 1990s was almost inseparable from 
domestic debates about multiculturalism’s perceived fragmentation (cf. Glazer 1997; Hall 
and Lindholm 1998: ch. 10).  
So once a decision was made to intervene in Bosnia, US policy had two aims: to 
stop the war and to build a multi-ethnic democratic Bosnia (Daalder 2000: esp. Ch. 5). 
Despite the robust network of think tanks and a plethora of available policy papers, 
working papers and academic studies on the conflict—despite decades of Balkan and 
Yugoslav expertise housed on the Seventh Floor of the State Department—the location of 
nation-building expertise and policy innovation in the now highly bureaucratized State 
Department emerged from two small, low-level desks: the Legal Advisor’s Office and the 
office for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (or DHRL) (previously Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs) (see Figure 3). As a result, the State Department’s international, 
civil and human rights lawyers were now at the heart of relevant democratic nation building 
knowledge and expertise.43 
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Figure 3:  State Department Organization, 1994-95 
 
Source: Office of the Historian, US Department of State (PA/HO) 
 
In part, this derived from the composition of these policy elites. Those involved in 
Bosnia policy in the Clinton administration comprised two generations of lawyers with 
backgrounds in human rights law or activism, international law and diplomacy, or 
constitutional law44 and civil rights; or they were strong advocates and practitioners of 
human rights45 and influential Washington lawyers, well-versed in international diplomacy.46 
Among this particular political elite, then, universalist frameworks for dealing with minority 
problems dominated.47 And in contrast to the composition of earlier elites, many more 
were women, minorities and, crucially, children of ECE wartime immigrants, bringing with 
them open commitments to liberal frameworks for addressing ethnic conflicts (e.g. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, special envoy Richard Holbrooke, and legal advisor 
Paul Szasz).48  
But as importantly, the influence of the State Department’s Balkan experts was 
notable for its marginalization as usable knowledge—largely because it was perceived as so 
institutionally embedded and bureaucratized that it could cause policy impasse.49 And yet 
paradoxically, the senior leadership at the State Department in the 1990s had an 
 18 
exceptionally strong cadre of Yugoslav experts with decades of experience and a deep 
scholarly knowledge of the Balkans: service officers making careers in the 1960s and 1970s 
had found Yugoslavia an interesting area of expertise given its Titoist deviation within 
Soviet sphere. So there was lots of embedded in-house expertise available (e.g. Brent 
Scowcroft, Jack Zetkulic, and Strobe Talbot). Most were fluent in Serbo-Croat, and in fact 
they were regularly consulted mostly for translation work. Marginalized from the substance 
of Bosnia policy, then, the State Department’s Seventh Floor Balkan specialists felt like 
‘jilted lovers’.50  
 
Data and deliberation: liberal legalism and Bosnian ethnic cleansing  
 
The interpretive framework for nation building data collection and analysis, then, reflected 
the social composition of these new knowledge experts as well as their institutional 
location—a location that excluded academic expertise except only very indirectly through 
the peripheral influence of think tank work. So while policy drift characterized the 
Administration’s Bosnia policy at the highest levels (Chollet 2005: Ch. 1-3), a quiet policy 
insurgency first emerged on an ad hoc and informal basis among low- and mid-level policy 
elites at the war crimes desk, the Legal Advisor’s Office and the DHRL. A small ‘war 
crimes working group’ had been following events and collecting data on Bosnia since early 
1992.51 In May 1993, Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger created an 
Interagency Working Group on War Crimes Evidence, known as Evidence IWG, which 
was co-chaired by David Scheffer and from the Office of the Legal Advisor, James 
O’Brien. They were tasked with collating the available information on “atrocity crimes” for 
eventual use by an international tribunal (Scheffer 2012: 35-44, and Ch. 1). The Evidence 
IWG, and its associated State Department desks, particularly in the Legal Advisor’s Office, 
interpreted incoming evidence from Bosnia not as substantive specialists, but as lawyers 
examining human rights abuses, war crimes and mass atrocity. And they became the policy 
relevant experts, eventually producing usable policy knowledge, analysing evidence of 
brutalities through a distinctive liberal legalist framework. 
More specifically, O’Brien’s office received incredibly detailed and very specific 
documentation on violence, killings, tortures, rape camps, hospital massacres and detention 
centres (cf. Scheffer 2012: Ch. 1, 2).52 Field reports, embassy cables and press reports 
contained similar and chilling accounts of brutalities, terrified populations and large-scale 
displacement.53 But this evidence was evaluated through a distinctive lens: they analyzed it 
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as ‘specific and gross human rights abuses’ based on refugee accounts;54 as a ‘tragic 
humanitarian and human rights situation on the ground’55; as a ‘humanitarian crisis’ 
amounting to genocide;56 as constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Convention;57 and 
as a general assessment that ethnic cleansing bore ‘the attributes of all categories of human 
rights abuses’.58 In other words, ethnic cleansing by Bosnia’s warring parties was 
interpreted through a liberal legalist prism of human rights and mass atrocity. 
Their analyses were primarily characterized by two data collection techniques—
both typical of human rights practices. First, in addition to collating reports from Emboffs 
(embassy officials), Evidence IWG also collected interviews with refugees who had escaped 
to Turkey, Germany and elsewhere; interagency teams were sent with UN or human rights 
organizations to collect their accounts for use in diplomacy to end the war and in 
preparation for an eventual war crimes tribunal.59 Second, they used advanced satellite 
imagery to track military activities, population displacements and evidence of mass graves.60 
So State Department lawyers from deep within its bureaucratic organization adopted 
human rights evidence collection techniques for ascertaining and documenting rights 
violations, and on this knowledge practice basis, produced a series of war crimes reports 
calling for humanitarian intervention in a place where geopolitical interests were hard to 
define or defend.  
The nation building knowledge produced had important policy reverberations. 
Bosnians were viewed less as reified ethnic or national groups, and more as political entities 
who used ethnicity, nationalism or religion as instruments for mobilizing political 
aspirations.61 As one interviewee put it to us, ‘to say that one is a Bosnian Serb is at once an 
expression of identity and a political aspiration or demand that we want to run our own 
thing.’62 The latter aspiration formed the relevant predicate for US policy because it implied 
a modern political claim that could be addressed, not the inevitability of a conflict based on 
ancient ethnic hatreds.  
So as this evidence streamed in, and as it was read through this human rights lens, a 
small group detached from formal State Department channels to draft documents in 
preparation for a peace settlement (Chollet 2005: 57-8). This legal team worked outside the 
agency process because proper bureaucratic channels—which would have included 
consultation with Balkan experts in the Department—would have been too cumbersome 
(Chollet 2005: 96-7). Also excluded was academic scholarly input, and even think tank 
knowledge. Relevant expertise and usable knowledge was now almost entirely legalist in 
substance. 
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So while they sought a peace agreement beyond simply ending the war: ‘they 
wanted to build a new Bosnia’ (Chollet 2005: 96).63 In practice, this meant that there was 
no consideration given to breaking-up Bosnia-Herzegovina.64 US opposition to partition 
was an unquestioned and long-standing position, and the red lines of policy meant 
preserving Bosnia’s territorial integrity and adhering to a previously negotiated 51-49 
percent territorial split between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska 
(Daalder 2000: 139; Chollet 2005: Ch. 2). But careful attention was paid to internal legal 
federal arrangements between the two ethnic entities, the Federation and the Republica 
Srpska, to ensure that stable (read ethnically homogenous) borders would help solidify 
liberal institutional arrangements. Explicit collective rights felt unnatural to both the US 
and European lawyers at Dayton: it was ‘against our American values’, one participant told 
us.65 The result was a human rights framework drawn around the demographic realities that 
ethnic cleansing had created—a recognition of ethnic entities. Because these policymakers 
evaluated Bosnia as a human rights war, Dayton contained the most robust and 
sophisticated human rights protections of any previous treaty.66 A liberal legalist political 
framework was viewed as an important source of social cohesion for a diverse, 
heterogeneous society, not least because it was believed that it would allow a more 
liberalized politics to emerge.   
The State Department’s official Dayton historian, Derek Chollet, relates that ‘it was 
not a knowledge problem…it was not a question of getting expertise to figure it out, they 
knew what the solution looked like’; it was a question of political will.67 While it is 
impossible to know what policy influence, if any, greater engagement with specialists might 
have had, but the absence of academic or Balkan specialists or substantive area expertise to 
inform the agreement was perhaps most notable (1) in the comparative lack of attention 
paid to the socioeconomic consequences of the conflict, (2) in the failure to defang the 
ethnicized political patronage systems, and (3) in the failure to properly address issues of 
local policing.68 Could different arrangements been imagined had there been greater social 
science knowledge or awareness of Bosnia’s ethnopolitics, constituencies and power bases? 
How good was the political intelligence, as opposed to the statistical intelligence? As 
O’Brien told us, ‘we haven’t grasped how to construct policy around democratic nation-
building where there is diversity, in part because we do not understand the underlying 
[contextual] power structures’.69 And one of Dayton’s human rights lawyers, Nysteun, told 
us: ‘we didn’t get this right and didn’t quite understand it in Bosnia’;70 ‘one could have 
imagined a lot of different arrangements’, but that would have ‘required knowledge on a 
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very detailed level about the persons involved and their interests and constituencies—
‘where was the specialist’?’71  
Indeed by the 1990s, relevant and usable nation building expertise (1) almost 
exclusively involved legalist and human rights knowledge practices, and (2) it was seen to 
reside among those policymakers with legal backgrounds and experience crafting peace 
treaties, not with academics—even those embedded in the State Department itself—with 
30 years of scholarly knowledge of the local, political context. US nation building social 
thought was still informed by (implicit or explicit) theorizations of its own evolving diverse 
democracy, but it now constructed nation building as an abstracted policy problem. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From 1919, the Inquiry’s Progressivist social scientific and substantive nation building 
expertise gave way to an equally empirical but more formalized geopolitical framework, as 
many of the same Progressive intellectuals—by mid-century New Dealers in government 
and in think tanks—were chastened by the failure of their interwar designs and sought to 
articulate the new US role in an emerging bipolar international order; but as Cold War 
conservatism ceded into a human rights internationalism, the diffusion of human rights 
frameworks in the early 1990s created a liberal legalist epistemology, which controlled both 
the methods of data collection and the lenses through which nation building was assessed 
and evaluated.  
 So over the arc of the 20th century, there were shifts in both expertise and in the 
interpretive frameworks used by social scientists/academics, policymakers and think tanks 
affected nation building foreign policy. US nation building expertise in and around the 
State Department underwent an empirical de-contextualization: from its substantialist 
qualities in its first instantiation as a knowledge problem, it came to be constructed as a policy 
problem, governed by generalizable conceptual frameworks. xxxxxxxx 
Changes in what qualified as relevant expertise and usable knowledge changed 
knowledge practices around data collection and evidence evaluation. And as the actual 
social location of nation building expertise shifted so, too, did its essential character: from 
social scientism to geopolitical empiricism to liberal legalism. As a result, nation building 
knowledge gradually became constructed as a generic policy problem--one requiring 
universally applicable (legalist) formulae--over contextually contingent, specialist, 
substantive knowledge. So its valorization of certain expertise, the criteria used in data 
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evaluation, and the character of the State Department’s knowledge practices have had a 
substantive effect on US nation building policy practices.  
We suggest, too, that this type of historically informed, comparative sociological 
analysis of nation building expertise, and the evolving knowledge practices around it, might 
offer insight into US nation building practices in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s—which 
continued with only some variation from those of the 1990s—just as it highlights the 
revalorization of substantive expertise and the return of the area specialist which marks the 
Obama State Department. 
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